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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES E. FREEGARD,
Plaintiff-appellant,
Case Nos.

-vs-

19503
19794

FIRST WESTERN NATIONAL BANK,
a corporation,
Defendant-respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
These cases are consolidated on appeal and involve claims
by appellant Freegard that respondent, First Western National Bank,
as an escrow agent, wrongfully endorsed over fire insurance proceeds
belonging to appellant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In the first case (District Court Civil No. 4939), the
District Court granted respondent's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings on the basis that disposition of insurance proceeds was
not within the scope of the bank's fiduciary duty under the escrow
agreement and that appellant had failed adequately to allege
negligence.

Appellant took an appeal to this court from that

decision and judgment.

(Supreme Court No. 19503) .

Appellant then filed a second suit (District Court Civil
No. 5052) grounded in negligence, and the District Court dismissed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that case on Motion of respondent based on a claim res judicata and
that respondent owed appellant no duty of due care.

Appellant has

also appealed from that decision and judgment (Supreme Court No.
19794) .
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Judgments of the District
Court in both cases, a finding that appellant has stated claims for
negligence and breach of contractual duty and a remand with instructions to grant appellant a trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 13, 1978, appellant, as Seller, entered into
a Uniform Real Estate Contract with Janice Campbell and David Clark,
as Buyers, for the sale of a certain parcel of real property, including
a house, in Grand County, State of Utah.

(No. 19503, R. 4-5)

The contract provided in part that the Buyers were to keep
the premises insured in an amount not less than the unpaid balance
owing on the contract.
In connection with the sale, appellant, the Buyers and
respondent, First Western National Bank (hereinafter referred to as
the "Bank") executed an escrow agreement (No. 19503, R. 20-21) whereby
the Bank would collect the payments under the Uniform Real Estate
Contract and credit them to appellant's account.
On January 9, 1981, the house located on the subject property
was destroyed by fire.

-2-
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Because the respondent First Western National Bank was
erroneously listed as a loss payee instead of Appellant, the insurer
paid the fire insurance proceeds to Clark and the Bank.

The Bank

endorsed the draft over to Clark, who used the funds to purchase
two mobile homes, the titles to which he deposited in escrow with
the Bank as substitute security for the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
Appellant then filed the first suit, District Court Civil
No. 4939, to recover the insurance proceeds.

In a Complaint and

Amended Complaint (19503, R. 1-10), Appellant based his claim
against the Bank on a breach of fiduciary duty arising from the
escrow agreement and, specifically, a clause contained in the
agreement making the Bank liable for any damages caused by its
"negligence or willful misconduct."
The Bank answered and filed a Motion for Judgment on the
pleadings and a Memorandum in Support (19503, R. 22-25), claiming
that the Bank, based on the allegations of Appellant's pleadings,
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Court granted the Bank's Motion and rendered a
judgment against Appellant for no cause of action.

(19503, R. 30-33),

Appellant filed an appeal from the Court's decision and
judgment (19503, R. 34-35) and also filed a second action against
the Bank grounded in negligence,

(District Court Civil No. 5052)

The Bank next filed a Motion to Dismiss Appellant's
second suit, claiming it was barred by the doctrine of res
judicata and on the theory that the Bank owed no duty of care to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ward appellant with reference to the insurance proceeds.

(No. 19794,

R. 10-19)
Appellant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Bank's
Motion (No. 19794, R. 20-27) and the Court granted the Bank's Motion,
dismissing appellant's Complaint with prejudice.

(No. 19794, R. 32038)

Appellant then filed an Appeal from the Court's judgment
in the second case and on Motion of Appellant and Stipulation of Counsel,
both cases have been consolidated on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
RESPONDENT OWED NO CONTRACTURAL DUTY TO
PLAINTIFF CONCERNING DISPOSITION OF THE
INSURANCE PROCEEDS
In the first case, the District judge found that the Bank
owed no contractural duty to appellant with reference to the fire
insurance proceeds because the escrow agreement was silent on that
point.
Appellant contends that the District Court defined too
narrowly the scope of the fiduciary duty owed by an escrow agent to
its principals.
It is a well established rule, conceded by the Bank in its
supporting Memorandum in the first case, that an escrow agreement
makes the depositary the agent of both the Buyer and Seller in a
real estate transaction.

Morris v. Clark, 100 Utah 252, 112 P.2d 153

(1941)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Bank's position, adopted by the District Court,
postulated that the Bank was not liable for wrongfully endorsing
over the insurance proceeds to Clark because the escrow agreement
was silent as to disposition of insurance proceeds and, thus, the
Bank owed no duty ot Appellant concerning the same.
The Bank's theory is flawed in two respects. First,
the escrow agreement itself clearly provides for liability for
loss or damage caused either by the negligence or willful misconduct of the Bank.

That language does not limit its application

only to the handling of matters which are specifically set forth
in the escrow instructions.

Second, an escrow depository is a

fiduciary held to a higher standard of care in dealing with its
principals, and is obligated not to exceed the authority vested in
it by the escrow agreement.

The depository will be held liable

for any damages caused by exceeding such authority.
In support of the first above-mentioned point, the
escrow agreement provides as follows:

"All funds collected on

this escrow are to be distributed as follows," and further sets
forth to whom the funds are to be paid.

When the bank received

and accepted the insurance check, the Bank had an obligation to
treat the check as collected funds and disbursed it according to
the escrow agreement.
The fact that the insurance check did not specifically
state "payment on contract" does not alter the fact that the
insurance proceeds were funds to be used to apply to the balance
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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due the respondents as provided in the sales contract between the
buyer and Respondent.
The Bank became involved as a party to the insurance
transaction because it was named a loss payee and was the escrow
agent.
action.

Otherwise it would have been a stranger to insurance transThe actions of the Bank in accepting and endorsing the

check to the Buyer were

obviously pursuant to the duty the Bank

considered itself to have pursuant to the escrow agreement.
The case of National Bank of Washington v. Equity
Investors, 81 T^ash. 2d 886, 506 P.2d 20 (1973), which was relied
upon by the Bank in its Memorandum to the District Court, actually
supports Appellant's position on the second point mentioned above.
The Court therein stated:
Thus, it is the rule that an escrow agent or
holder becomes liable to his principals for
damage proximately resulting from his breach of
the instructions, or from his exceeding the
authority conferred on him by the instructTons.
(Emphasis added) 506 P.2d at 35
The fiduciary nature of the escrow relationship obligates the depositary to act in strict compliance with its duties
under the agreement.

It constitutes a breach of the fiduciary

duty to deviate from the terms of the agreement and the escrow
agent is liable for all damages proximately resulting from such
deviation.

Tucson Title Insurance Co. v. D'Ascoli, 94 Ariz. 230,

383 P.2d 984 (1962); Miller v. Craig, 27 Ariz. App. 789, 558 P.2d
984 (1976).
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The Supreme Court of Utah has adopted the position that
an escrow agent which exceeds the authority of its escrow instructions is liable for damages caused to a principal.

In W. P.

Harlin Construction Co. v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 23 Utah
2d 422, 464 P.2d 585 (1970), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a
judgment against an escrow agent who exceeded his authority by
paying a claim other than the one for which the check in question
had been delivered.
Consequently, Appellant asserts that the Bank in this
case owed a contractual, fiduciary duty to Appellant when it undertook to exceed its escrow authority by disbursing the fire insurance proceeds to one of the Buyers.

Such a disbursement without

checking to see who was the proper party to receive the proceeds
constituted a breach of that fiduciary duty.
As a result, the District Court erred in granting a
judgment of no cause of action against Appellant in the first case.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT NO DUTY OF DUE CARE EXISTED
SEPARATE FROM ANY CONTRACTUAL DUTY.
In addition to finding that no contractual duty with
reference to insurance proceeds arose from the terms of the escrow
agreement itself, the district judge, in both the first and second
written decisions, found that the Bank had not been negligent in
handling the insurance proceeds on a theory that a duty of due
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care would arise only if there x^ere an express agreement in the
escrow instructions concerning insurance proceeds.
In the first written decision, the Court stated:
Without some allegation of duty owed under the
express agreement, there is no allegation of negligence properly stated. (No. 19503, R. 31)
That position x^as mimicked in the District Court's written decision in the second case wherein the Court stated:
There is no mention of the existence of any insurance or payment to be made in case of any loss and,
therefore, no duty was created with regard to insurance proceeds to which a standard of conduct could
attach. (No. 19794, R. 34)
The District Court's position on this issue fundamentally
miscomprehends the law regarding negligence.

The duty of exercising

due care in a given situation does not depend for its existence on
a co-extensive contractual right or obligation.
The logic of the Court's position is such that a party
injured by the negligence of an automobile driver could not recover
for his injuries unless a contractual right or obligation existed.
In fact, it is Hornbook law that the duty to exercise due care
derives from the operation of the automobile itself and does not
depend on any such contractual relationship between one driver and
another.
In the present case, assuming for the purpose of argument
that no contractual duty existed, the duty of the Bank to exercise
ordinary care arose from its undertaking to disburse the insurance
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proceeds whether or not the escrow instructions covered such a
matter.

The failure of the Bank to ascertain, or even attempt to

ascertain, the proper recipient of the funds amounts to a breach of
the duty to exercise due care once having undertaken the task.
The Oregon appellate court in the case of McDonald v. Title
Insurance Company of Oregon, 49 Or. App. 1055, 621 P.2d 654 (1981),
held that a volunteer is liable for its negligence.

In that par-

ticular case a title insurer/escrow officer voluntarily chose to
advise the insured plaintiffs on a matter outside the title
policy or escrow instructions.

The plaintiff claimed that, des-

pite an absence of contractual duty, once Defendants chose to
give advise separate from the contract, they had a duty of exercising reasonable care in providing such advice.

Noting this

type of claim involved the "rescue" doctrine, the court accepted
the argument and found the title insurance company liable for the
insureds1 loss.
The Florida courts also find a duty in such circumstances.

In Biadi v. Lawyers Title Insurance Co., 374 So. 2d 30

(Fla. App. 1979), the court recognized:
Although Florida law adheres to the general proposition that the "escrow instructions" define the
duties of the escrow agent, there must be consideration as to further steps that were taken in this
transaction which concern "additional" or "superseding" duties that could be construed to have
been voluntarily undertaken by appellee-escrow
agent and about which a jury should decide.
Id. at 35.
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The court overturned a Summary Judgment Order in the
Biadi case and remanded the case to the lower court to determine
whether or not the escrow agent acted with care and diligence when
it acted voluntarily.

A footnote to that instruction indicated

the following negligence doctrine applied in that determination:
There have been decisions in negligence cases where
the allegedly negligent act, even though gratuitously
undertaken, has been subjected to the standard of
duty of due care. See Banfleld v. Addington, 104
Fla. 661, 140 So. 893 (1932) and 6 ALR 2d 284.
Id. at 35, F. N. 14
A negligence action may exist entirely separate and apart
from any contractual relationship which might exist between the
parties.
1983)

DCR Incorporated v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah,

Thus, even if this Court finds that the Bank breached no

contractual duty to Appellant it may find that the Bank owed a duty
of due care by volunteering to disburse the insurance proceeds.
In fact, the Court in DCR Incorporated v. Peak Alarm Co.,
supra, extends the duty of due care even further when the parties
involved also share a contractual relationship for performance of
services.

The Court stated:
Similarly, contractual relationships for the performance of services impose on each of the contracting parties a duty of due care towards the other,
apart from the specific obligations expressed in
the contract itself. The care to be exercised in
any particular case depends upon the circumstances
of that case and on the extent of foreseeable danger involved and must be determined as a question
of fact. 663 P.2d at 435
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It is apparent that the District Court totally misconstrued the law relating to negligence and Appellant is entitled to a reversal and remand for trial on this point.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA.
As part of the Court's overall decision in the first
suit, the Court found that a claim for negligence was not properly
stated by Appellant;
While Appellant felt that the Complaint and the Amended
Complaint in the first suit adequately raised an issue of negligence, in response to the above-mentioned portion of the District Court's ruling, Appellant filed the second suit, basing the
claim solely on negligence.
Assuming only for purposes of argument that the District Court was correct in finding that negligence was not plead
properly in the first case, it was clearly erroneous for the Court
to rule that the second suit was barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.
It must be noted that the Motion filed by the Bank in
the first case was for a judgment on the pleadings.

No affidavits

or other material beyond the pleading and exhibits attached thereto
were filed to save Memoranda which discussed only the matters
raised in the pleadings.

Consequently, the Court did not and, right-

fully, could not, treat the Motion as one for a summary judgment on
the merits.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Consequently, the District Court's assertion in the ruling in the second suit that it "granted summary judgment against
the plaintiff" in the first suit in incorrect.

The Court dealt

only with matters raised by the pleadings and could not convert
that ruling to a summary judgment on the merits as the ruling in
the second case purports to do.
Where the Bank and the Court reached only the issue of
a contractual duty, it was clearly improper for the District Court
to bar the second suit on grounds of res judicata where the second
suit was clearly based on a claim of negligence.
Where the issue of negligence was not addressed in the
Motion for Judgment on the pleadings, it was improper for the Court
to grant the Motion to Dismiss under a theory of res judicata.
The District Court relied in its dismissal of the second
suit on the case of Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45, 376 P.2d
946 (1962).

However, the District Court ignored the language of

Pearson, supra, limiting the application of res judicata as a bar:
On the other hand, where the claim, demand or cause
of action is different in the two cases then the
former is res judicata of the latter only to the
extent that the former actually raised and decided
the same points and issues raised in the latter.
376 P.2d at 947
Such is precisely the case before the Court.

The Dis-

trict Court in Appellant's first case construed the Complaint and
the Amended Complaint as encompassing only a contractual issue and,
because the Court did not, and could not, in its first decision,
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treat the matter as a Motion for Summary Judgment, then the contractual issue was the only issue decided by judgment on the
pleadings.
Consequently, the Court should have denied the Bank's
Motion to Dismiss in the second case and allowed the case to proceed to trial.

It was only the District Court's fundamental mis-

comprehension of the doctrine of res judicata and of the distinction between contractual duties and negligence theory that led
to the onerous result of Appellant's not being permitted any
remedy for the obvious mishandling of the insurance proceeds,
which should properly belong to Appellant under the Uniform Real
Estate Contract.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant requests a reversal
of the District Court's decisions and judgments in both cases and
a remand for trial on both claims of breach of a contractual duty
and negligence.
DATED this

^ S

day of April, 1984.
Respectfully submitted,
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